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The abuse of natural resources in Indonesia has generally been cast as a simple 
matter of power and patronage. My thesis is that these abuses reflect deeper and much 
more surprising circumstances. First, the motive is as much the desire to pursue 
particular development strategies as it is to maximize political power or wealth. 
Second, the abuse occurs because of disunity within the Indonesian government. 
Natural-resource manipulations have proven to be an easy way for the Presidency to 
prevent this disunity from imposing political costs on the state. President Suharto has 
cleverly managed to keep this disunity from erupting into open conflict by avoiding 
head-to-head confrontations with government agencies in charge of the central 
budgeting process, most notably the Finance Ministry and the planning agency 
BAPPENAS (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional; National Development 
Planning Agency). He has done so by using natural-resource wealth for government 
spending outside the central budget. He has also directed the private expenditure of 
natural-resource wealth that, according to sound natural-resource management 
practices, should have gone to the central treasury. Whether or not the central budget 
authorities could have blocked the President's initiatives if he had challenged them 
directly, this strategy of off-budget financing saved the regime the considerable 
embarrassment that would have emerged if the confrontation had been acute. Natural 
resource wealth—largely oil and timber—has been very convenient for off-budget
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maneuvers because it is easily diverted from central government coffers with minimal 
public visibility. Unfortunately, these maneuvers have come at enormous cost to the 
natural resource base: mismanagement in the oil sector practically bankrupted 
Indonesia in the mid-1970s, and unsound forestry policies have led to enormous losses 
to the economy and environmental degradation.
The power of this explanation is reinforced by its applicability to both the 
Indonesian oil sector in the 1960s and early 1970s and the forest sector beginning in the 
mid-1970s and persisting today. Oil rents that under normal fiscal regimes would have 
gone into the central treasury were diverted in the earlier period through the 
operations of the state oil company Pertamina, which served as the President's off- 
budget "development agency" for a host of projects that would not have been 
supported by key ministries such as the Finance Ministry or the national planning 
agency. The very price of gasoline, kerosene, and other oil products had been set 
artificially low to promote oil-dependent industries. During the mid-1970s through the 
1990s, the diversion of forest rents was accomplished by undercharging the private 
loggers for the concessions and royalties, and those loggers in return have applied part 
of their profits to the development projects that the president has signaled as his 
priorities. Within the state, the Forestry Ministry also helped in diverting forest rents 
into financing the rapid and highly controversial development of Indonesia's Outer 
Islands. An even newer maneuver involves the Forestry Ministry's capture of the so- 
called "reforestation fee," which has been applied through interest-free loans to state 
enterprises. All of these mechanisms have allowed the presidency to evade 
accountability for pursuing development initiatives that are potentially embarrassing 
from a hard-nosed economic perspective.
How do these maneuvers detract from sustainable resource exploitation? First, 
by undercharging for concession privileges and royalties, these manipulations 
encourage over-exploitation—the obvious result of cheap access. This problem was 
severe for both the state oil company and the private loggers. Timber under-charging 
in the forestry case also led to reckless exploitation, the result of the exploiters' 
uncertainty that their privileges would be available indefinitely. Second, under-pricing 
of outputs, first oil products and later logs, triggered uneconomical domestic resource 
consumption. This culminates in inefficient and resource-vulnerable industries in 
petroleum processing and wood processing. Third, the extraction of rents for special 
funds, such as the reforestation fund, have entailed quasi-taxation that has encouraged 
inappropriate resource exploitation.
B. The Oil Sector
Indonesia's state oil company Pertamina emerged in 1968 in the same fashion 
as many other state oil companies: through the amalgamation of small preexisting state 
oil enterprises (in the Indonesian case, several) and larger operations taken over from 
international oil companies. In Pertamina's case, the holdings of small state producing 
companies were greatly expanded by a 1963 agreement by subsidiaries of Shell, 
Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Mobil to relinquish 
their holdings to the government in exchange for long-term contractor arrangements. 
Some preexisting state operations had been in the downstream activities of oil 
transport and gas stations. Pertamina became a vertically integrated company with
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exclusive control from exploration to domestic marketing. However, the new 
Pertamina was short on expertise in virtually all aspects of the oil business.1 Pertamina 
continued to rely on international oil companies for many services. Pertamina's own 
exploration and production operations (i.e., apart from international contractors) 
produced only 10 percent of Indonesia's oil output in the 1970s and 1980s, and only 5 
percent in the first half of the 1990s.
One novel aspect of the pre-1968 arrangement was that several small state 
operations were directly and formally controlled by the armed forces. Permina and 
Nglobo Oil Mining (later called Permigan) were established in the 1950s under military 
control when the army began the post-WWH, post-independence reconstruction of the 
devastated oil fields. It was widely understood and accepted that oil exploitation by 
these parastatals was a source of revenues for the armed forces.
Moreover, the charismatic head of Permina, General Ibnu Sutowo, became the 
head of the new Pertamina. Thus the heritage of Pertamina was a set of practices 
pursued by predecessors dedicated to augmenting the revenues of the armed forces, 
and directed by an instinct to keep the operations and financing secretive. This was a 
moderate problem when military-controlled oil operations were of modest dimensions. 
Yet by 1974, Pertamina's revenues, in the wake of the OPEC price increase, were 
US$4.2 billion—one-sixth of Indonesia's gross domestic product.2 Pertamina's 
international debt exceeded that of the Indonesian government's.
As a wholly government-owned enterprise with enormous revenues and 
expenses both domestically and internationally, Pertamina posed an overwhelming 
temptation for political leaders who wished to direct its revenues and forces toward 
political, distributional, and developmental objectives beyond its mandate as an oil 
company. The key political challenges for the government of President Suharto were to 
maintain the unity, strength and support of the Indonesian military; keep riot-prone 
populations and business groups content with a growing economy; and counter the 
forces of separatism and Communist insurgency. All the while, the Indonesian 
government was trying to cultivate sources of foreign assistance, including the United 
States and other OECD countries, as well as the multilateral agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund. An openly defense-heavy national budget would have 
looked very bad; international borrowing beyond agreed limits would have looked 
even worse.
The centrifugal forces of the culturally and ethnically fragmented country were 
held in check by the might of the armed forces, but these same armed forces had 
toppled General Sukarno and were also struggling to contain a Communist opposition, 
several separatist movements, bloody inter-ethnic conflicts, periodic food riots, and 
other challenges to order and security. Adding to the potential for disintegration was 
the fact that regional commanders often had enough power to pose the threat of 
warlordism. The armed forces' demands for financial resources were enormous. As 
Hamish McDonald notes:
1 In contrast to Venezuela's PDVSA (Petrolcos de Venezuela, S. A; Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation), 
which retained a large cadre of expatriate managers and well-trained local managers.
2 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 54.
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The size of the military budget in particular had long been a delicate problem since 
it was proving less and less adequate to cover real needs. By the time Suharto took 
power it was an accepted fact that the armed forces had their own independent 
sources of funds. Suharto's need to unify the military vastly increased the demand. 
A basic strategy was to make soldiers rely as much as possible on Defence 
headquarters, rather than their regional commander, for their new uniforms, 
improved housing, pay and meal supplements. There were about half a million 
men in uniform to keep happy. Added to this were 1.7 million civilian employees 
(according to a special census taken in 1974 to see just how many were on the 
payroll, the first time a total had been determined), forming a comparatively small 
percentage of the population but in absolute numbers an enormous burden on 
Indonesia's revenue base.3
Thus, as a way of financing the armed forces without the visibility of central 
government spending, an undetermined, but certainly huge amount of Pertamina 
revenues went to the armed forces, even after the military-controlled oil companies 
were amalgamated under the single company structure.
More broadly, Pertamina was the public-works patronage agency and the few- 
questions-asked development agency when the Finance Ministry, the planning agency 
BAPPENAS, and the international lenders were insisting on austerity. Pertamina built 
hospitals, schools, and roads that served many people and purposes beyond the oil 
sector. In 1970 a presidential "Commission of Four" appointed to examine general 
charges of corruption in government criticized Pertamina for, among other things, 
"making unauthorized donations."4
The development strategy pursued directly through Pertamina operations was 
a remarkably broad industrialization and infrastructure expansion, unfettered by 
careful analysis of rates of return or significant government oversight.5 Some of 
Pertamina's expansions were clearly connected to the oil business, although a state oil 
company could have easily forgone these investments: two US$1 billion liquified 
natural gas facilities and a three-million-ton tanker fleet requiring a US$3.3 billion 
investment. Some were down-stream petroleum-reliant industries, most prominently 
petrochemicals and fertilizer. However, other investments were at best only tenuously 
connected to the oil sector: a chain of hotels, rice estates, automobile distributorships, 
insurance, telecommunications, and the Pelita airline, which boasted the largest 
helicopter fleet in Southeast Asia. Pertamina even financed and operated a new 
industrial growth pole on Batam Island.6
One project in particular epitomized the "nationalists'" agenda: Krakatau Steel. 
This was a project to revitalize and expand the Soviet-built facility that went out of 
production in 1965, facing severe problems of old technology, lack of nearby ore and 
energy sources, and shortage of skilled manpower. None of the economic analyses 
indicated that the original project, or any modification of that sort at that site, were 
worth undertaking, but the steel industry was the quintessential emblem of
3 Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1981), p. 115.
4 McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p 124.
5 John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modem Political Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), pp. 168-71,182-3.
6 McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p. 157.
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modernization and industrial prestige. Sutowo quadrupled the targeted output of 
Krakatau and invested US$2.5 billion for new construction, including a pipeline to 
bring natural gas from over 130 miles away.7 These investments were made despite the 
absence of formal authorization by the government.
Pertamina was permitted to undertake these tasks not only because of General 
Sutowo's personal dynamism and his close relationship with President Suharto, but 
also because its access to investable capital was greater than any other institution short 
of the government treasury, and the latter was guarded by rather formidable 
"technocrats" who had the technical expertise and access to international fora to 
embarrass the President about these problematic development ventures if he were to 
try to pursue them through the conventional budget process. These technocrats were 
very influential even when Suharto wished to pursue development projects that ran 
counter to their vision of Indonesia's development. R. M. Auty notes:
The Indonesian civil service, which had been so faction-ridden as to be almost 
incapable of action under Sukarno, became more effective under Soeharto. Even 
though rent-seeking flourished and political fiefdoms persisted at local and 
national levels (in both the public and private sectors, notably in industry), a 
bureaucratic pluralism existed . . . Able technocrats retained sufficient 
independence from the military to prevent key development ministries (Finance, 
Mines and energy, Industry, and Public Works) from being wholly dominated by 
considerations of patronage. Although the balance of power shifted between two 
polarized technocratic factions, one comprising sectoral, statist nationalists and the 
other pragmatic, market-oriented technocrats . . .  the latter faction was effectively 
used during the two oil booms to realign the economy periodically to real external 
constraints.8
Pertamina's access to capital obviously rested on oil revenues, but, like Mexico, 
the state oil company also had access to huge foreign loans that could be directed to 
spending targets chosen jointly by President Suharto and General Sutowo. The billions 
of dollars of loans to Pertamina were ostensibly for petroleum exploration, production, 
refining, and distribution, but both revenues and borrowed capital were also directed 
to other ends.
Pertamina's capacity to serve these functions clearly rested on the company's 
lack of transparency. The 1970 presidential Commission of Four complained about 
Pertamina's opaque accounting, lack of government oversight, and failure to 
relinquish funds ostensibly collected on behalf of the government.9 It is significant that 
the reports of the Commission of Four were never officially released by the Indonesian 
government; public knowledge of the reports came only through leaks to the press.10 
Hamish McDonald put it bluntly:
7 Ibid.
8 R.M. Auty, Resource-Based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight Developing Countries (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 116.
9 McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, pp. 124,154.
10 Ibid., p. 125.
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Suharto needed Ibnu Sutowo to get things done . . .  to provide funds for a 
threadbare army, to wean troops away from regional commanders, and to carry 
out essential political patronage. Ibnu Sutowo provided access to a vast, invisible 
system of taxation and expenditure that would be difficult to justify to the public if 
added to the official budget.11
McDonald's assessment makes it clear that Pertamina's capacity to operate 
without transparency was to a large degree dependent on the support of the President. 
Pertamina's clashes with government agencies over the control of oil revenues were 
highlighted by the controversy over the type of relationship the company should 
maintain with international oil companies. In 1966, General Sutowo, as both head of 
Pertamina's predecessor Permina and the government's Director General for Oil and 
Gas, signed production-sharing contracts over the objections of his formal superior, 
Minister of Mines Slamet Bratanata. In early 1967 Bratanata retaliated by offering 
leases that contradicted Sutowo's contracts, despite President Suharto's support for 
Sutowo. Suharto responded by removing Permina from the Ministry's control, and by 
October removed Bratanata from the cabinet. Similarly, in 1973 the attacks on 
Pertamina's international borrowing were fended off by President Suharto through his 
assertion that Sutowo had been entrusted to find his own financing.12
The Fall of Pertamina
Pertamina's downfall came not from the questionable spending of its own 
revenues, but rather from its international borrowing. Like Mexico's PEMEX (Petrolcos 
Mexicanos; Mexican Petroleum Corporation), Pertamina was able to get international 
banks to grant it its own credit ceiling beyond that of the government. By 1975, 
Pertamina's foreign debt was US$10.5 billion, compared to the government's foreign 
debt of US$8 billion. Given the enormous range of Pertamina activities, it is clear that 
not all of this borrowed capital was going into the development of the oil sector. 
Pertamina was, in effect, borrowing on behalf of a broad range of programs and 
projects that President Suharto, if not the Indonesian Finance Ministry, was eager to 
fund off-budget. For its part, the Finance Ministry had to cope with the overall 
problem of declining hard-currency reserves.
In 1972 the Finance Ministry negotiated a stand-by agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund that put a ceiling on the government's medium-term (one- 
to fifteen-year) loans, backed up by a government decree requiring the Finance 
Ministry to approve all medium-term borrowings by state enterprises or government 
agencies. Pertamina was reprimanded for borrowing more than US$350 in 1972 
without permission, but government oversight was not appreciably improved.13
Apparently Pertamina desisted in this defiance of the medium-term borrowing 
limits enforced by the Finance Ministry. Yet by 1973, Pertamina found ways to borrow 
massively without violating the then-publicized prohibition on unauthorized medium- 
term borrowing. Taking advantage of the growing supply of short-term loans available
11 Ibid., p. 151.
12 Ibid., pp. 151-55.
13 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
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because of greater international liquidity, Pertamina increased its short-term exposure, 
while at the same time taking out long-term loans that also did not require Finance 
Ministry approval.
By 1975 Pertamina's debt included US$1.5 billion in short-term loans that the 
company could not cover because the fall in world oil prices sharply reduced 
Pertamina's oil revenues. Pertamina's capital was tied up in long-term projects like 
Krakatau Steel and the natural gas projects. International banks, learning more of 
Pertamina's precarious position, took advantage of cross-default contract provisions 
that permitted them to call in more of their loans.
The Indonesian government was forced to take over Pertamina's debt 
obligations, cancel or postpone many Pertamina-controlled projects, and suffer from 
severely reduced international borrowing for the rest of the decade. This was not an 
isolated event of a parastatal bankruptcy; given the magnitude of Pertamina's total 
debt, the entire nation's creditworthiness was on the line, and the central bank had to 
renegotiate its own borrowings to secure the hard currency to meet Pertamina's 
repayment obligations.
Pertamina's total debt burden was reduced by selling tankers and canceling 
tanker leases; postponing the petrochemical and industrial complex on Batam Island; 
cutting back on Krakatau Steel to its original targeted output, now under the direction 
of a BAPPENAS official; and negotiating other sell-offs and cancellations that largely 
dismantled Pertamina as a multi-sectoral conglomerate. The government managed to 
obtain new medium-term financing to cover the short-term obligations, with the 
support of the US government and other industrial nations. Hamish McDonald 
reported that Indonesia's international borrowing up to 1980 was only half of what it 
would have been were it not for the Pertamina bankruptcy.14
The Structural Changes of the Aftermath
By early 1976, Ibnu Sutowo was dismissed (though "with honor") and 
Pertamina was placed under the direction of the former Budget Director of the Finance 
Ministry, Major-General Piet Haryono. By 1976 the government instituted the 
following reforms:
1) Bank Indonesia (the central bank) assumed all Pertamina debts;
2) Bank Indonesia, acting on behalf of the Finance Ministry, had to negotiate 
and sign all Pertamina loans;
3) Bank Indonesia became the recipient of all Pertamina revenues, and 
supervised this special account;
4) Non-oil projects were either canceled or transferred to other government 
units, and the company was expressly forbidden to operate beyond the oil and 
gas sector15;
14 Ibid., p. 164.
15 Nevertheless, the boundaries of the "oil and gas sector" are fuzzy enough to have allowed Pertamina to 
keep its Pelita airlines and the petrochemical industry.
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5) Bank Indonesia tightened up on its supervision of Pertamina financial
records.16
In addition, international auditors (the firm of Arthur Young & Associates; later 
Price Waterhouse) were brought in to restructure Pertamina's books. Finally, and of 
much broader importance, all government agencies and state enterprises were 
required to submit their financial and investment plans to a tripartite committee of 
officials from Bank Indonesia, the Finance Ministry, and BAPPENAS. This committee 
had to pre-approve all loans for government agencies and parastatals.17 In short, the 
victory of the central budgetary authorities (and, to a large degree, the so-called 
"technocrats") was complete—for the time being.
These reforms were capped by a modified oversight arrangement for 
Pertamina. The Board of Commissioners established in the wake of the 1970 
Commission of Four critique was strengthened: the company was now to be governed 
by a Board of Commissioners chaired by the Minister of Mines, with the Finance 
Minister as Vice Chair. Other members were the Minister State Secretary, the State 
Secretary for Research and Technology, and the head of the planning agency 
BAPPENAS. Informally, the cabinet ministers of Mines, Finance, Communications, and 
Planning—all prominent "technocrats"—took control of straightening out the oil and 
gas sector.18 Combined with greatly improved (but still not ideal) financial and 
operational transparency, this collective oversight dramatically reduced the capacity of 
any intra-govemmental actor to use the company to circumvent the policy preferences 
and jurisdictional claims of other governmental actors. Whatever ulterior motives were 
to be pursued by Pertamina had to be thoroughly vetted and approved by this broad 
range of governmental units. Certainly the visibility of Pertamina operations through 
this oversight made all involved agencies aware of the company's operations. This 
structure brought the policymakers closer to consensus in how Pertamina's operations 
should be conducted and its revenues spent:
Pertamina is no longer the self-willed prestige state within a state that it once w as. 
. .  All major policy decisions on hydrocarbon investment, production and pricing 
appear to be taken by the government primarily in the form of the Minister of 
Mines and Energy and the country's president. However, the National 
Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) and key ministers such as the 
Coordinating Minister for Industry and Trade...play important roles in major 
policy decisions. The interlocking directorships and chairmen of the various 
bodies involved in energy matters should allow a reasonable consensus to be 
developed.19
This is not to say that Pertamina was tamed overnight. Pertamina's accounts 
remained inadequate, though significantly better than in the pre-1975 era. The 
Economist reported in mid-1981 that "[sjince Pertamina crashed six years ago, the
16 Albert Royaards and William Hui, "Indonesia Struggles to Recover from the Pertamina Affair," 
Euromoney (March 1977): 37-42, at p. 37.
17 Royaards and Hui, "Indonesia Struggles," p. 42.
18 Peter Rutledge, "Letter from Jakarta," Business Week (October 25,1976): 26.
19 Philip Barnes, Indonesia: The Political Economy of Energy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 154.
From Oil to Timber 45
accounting firm, Price Waterhouse, has been struggling to audit the company's books. 
Every year it has said it would have the books ready for public inspection, and every 
year it has had to postpone the unveiling."20 Nonetheless, the periodic efforts to clean 
up the records and root out corruption have all made inroads, inasmuch as Pertamina 
was no longer able to dismiss these efforts as it was prior to 1975. Most importantly, 
Pertamina ceased to be the prime vehicle of off-budget wheeling and dealing. Philip 
Barnes, in an otherwise quite critical assessment of the Indonesian oil sector, 
summarizes the strides made in reforming Pertamina:
By 1979, much of the non-oil business had been dismantled and the company had 
largely, although not wholly, reverted to its statutory role as an oil and gas 
enterprise. Pertamina is still allowed to involve itself in some outside interests in 
support of it oil and gas business but such activities now seem to be kept within 
reasonable bounds. Oil and gas revenues are channeled to central government to 
finance development plans and there is a suitable level of auditing . . .  21
However, in one area Pertamina remained outside of the grasp of those 
government officials who wished to wrest more of the oil rents from the enterprise. 
Pertamina remained, and indeed grew, as a patronage employer. The 1979-81 second 
oil boom prompted Pertamina to add employees despite the shedding of direct 
exploration responsibilities; by the mid-1980s, Pertamina had fifty-four thousand 
employees in addition to twenty-four thousand contractor employees in exploration 
and production.22
It is important to point out what Pertamina has done well. It has done a solid 
job in overseeing the rate and pricing of oil production destined for export. The 
continued reliance on international oil companies for exploration and production 
maintained a crucial role for market considerations in making decisions on exploration 
rates, production rates, sales volumes and export pricing, within the parameters 
permitted under OPEC. Compared to PEMEX and PDVSA, which are the major 
producers in Mexico and Venezuela respectively, Pertamina's functions with respect to 
"upstream" oil production have essentially been to negotiate contracts and collect 
royalties from the international companies. Insofar as Pertamina has been in a far 
weaker position post-1975 to capture these royalties, the company has performed this 
function well, through continual pressure on the companies to accept lower shares of 
the oil they produce.23 With more than one hundred different companies and consortia 
bidding on Indonesian oil contracts, this approaches an auction mechanism and paces 
the rate of exploration according to the government's need for income and the 
company's perceptions of prospectivity and future world market prices. While some 
Indonesians have complained that the production-sharing contracts have been more 
generous than those of the Middle Eastern oil giants, this is a reflection of Indonesia's 
lower prospectivity and the more difficult production conditions in the forests and
20 Anonymous, "Pertamina: The Profligates Return?" The Economist ( June 20,1981), p. 85.
21 Barnes, Indonesia: The Political Economy of Energy, pp. 151-2.
22 Auty, Resource-Based Industrialization, p. 145.
23 The traditional fear of government of developing countries in dealing with international oil companies 
is that they will capture more of the resource rent than the government would if its own entities were 
exploiting the oil.
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swamps of Kalimantan, Sumatra, Irian Jaya, and other field locations. Because 
international capital directed by the international oil companies was available for 
exploration and production only when market conditions were appropriate, Indonesia 
has avoided both the political pressures to squander resources on politically motivated 
exploration and production (as in Peru) and the consequences of state enterprise 
under-capitalization (as in Mexico and Venezuela).
However, one weakness in Pertamina's relations to the international oil 
company contractors has been the requirement that the contractors provide social and 
community services in the regions of oil exploitation. While this serves the political 
function of giving the appearance that the international companies have been squeezed 
to provide even more than their royalty payments, it places the responsibility for 
planning and undertaking community and social services (such as health clinics, town 
paving, and even entertainment) in the hands of international oil companies, who are 
in no better position to perform effectively and efficiently in these spheres as 
Pertamina oil geologists were to run hotels. In addition, the provision of these services 
in specific oil-producing areas often entails inequitable benefits compared to other 
areas.
In terms of the advisability and efficiency of downstream investments, 
Pertamina's performance also appears to be reasonable. Large-scale projects such as 
refineries and liquid gas facilities have typically been joint ventures, which subject the 
project to the rate-of-retum scrutiny of an international, private-sector partner; or have 
required international borrowing, which subjects the project to the scrutiny and 
approval of the oversight ministries, the central bank (Bank Indonesia) and the 
planning agency. Some corrupt practices in local contracting have been reported, but 
the overall advisability of Pertamina downstream projects has been vastly improved 
over the days of Krakatau Steel.
Domestic Pricing Problems
During the 1970s, the domestic prices of Indonesian petroleum products were 
heavily subsidized, leading to over-consumption, lost opportunities for oil export, and 
the development of industries vulnerable to future energy-price increases. For a 
country likely to be a net oil importer early in the twenty-first century, this last risk 
was much more serious than for countries like Venezuela and Mexico with much 
greater potential reserves. From 1975 to 1980, domestic consumption of primary 
petroleum products grew by an annual rate of over 9 percent, compared to a GDP 
growth rate of 7 percent. In 1980 the government set up the National Energy 
Coordinating Board with the principal objective of reducing domestic oil 
consumption.24 In particular, the huge subsidies for kerosene, initially rationalized as 
support for low-income households to cover their energy needs, led to the 
inappropriate use of kerosene for transportation, heating, and other purposes outside 
of the household. As late as 1987, kerosene accounted for more than a quarter of 
Indonesia's domestic petroleum consumption, a figure far too high given Indonesia's
24 Bames, Indonesia, p. 82.
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biomass potential.25 The subsidy also led to smuggling, as some individuals bought 
cheap kerosene in order to sell it abroad at a markup.
The policy of low domestic petroleum-product prices that prevailed in the 
1970s was propelled as much by a cheap-energy industrialization strategy as it was to 
mollify a mobilized consumer population. The nationalists favored inexpensive energy 
for industry and transport, and the expansionary climate made it difficult for the 
government to insist on the discipline of keeping domestic prices in line with rising 
production costs. Yet the core of the strategy of oil-led industrialization was to 
maintain petroleum exports as the chief source of foreign exchange to finance domestic 
industrial and infrastructural growth.
Liberalization came once there was a strong demonstration of how onerous the 
costs of under-pricing were for this core strategy. The 1982 economic crunch that 
reduced Indonesia's GDP growth from nearly 8 percent to only 2 percent coincided 
with a 25 percent production decline of crude. Even though world oil prices remained 
nearly as high as in 1981, the decline in government revenues was so alarming that the 
technocrats were able to press for increased domestic petroleum product prices as the 
obvious measure to make more crude available for export. Higher prices would reduce 
the domestic demand for crude, leaving a larger portion of Pertamina's share of crude 
production for export. Barnes notes that "[diminished oil production reduced 
government revenues and strained the policy of using production-sharing crude for 
subsidized sales of petroleum products to the domestic market. As a result subsidies 
were cut in 1982-3 and domestic fuel prices increased by 60 to 75 percent."26
The liberalization also reflected changed views on the entitlement nature of 
energy. As long as Indonesian oil seemed limitless, cheap oil-based energy was widely 
regarded as a gift of God. The decline in oil production, as dependent as it was on 
complex factors such as the incentives for international companies to explore for new 
fields (which in turn is a function of world oil price expectations), was a very sobering 
reminder of the finite nature of the nation's oil reserves.
Then, too, the economic crisis put the technocrats into a stronger position to 
determine economic policy, and one of the technocrats' main preoccupations was the 
adequacy of central government revenues, which they controlled through the 
technocrat's dominance in the Finance Ministry and the planning agency BAPPENAS. 
However, there was a broadening consensus that energy prices ought to be liberalized. 
This reflected the fact that price subsidies were no longer serving the development 
objectives held dear by the nationalists, and of course remained anathema to the 
technocrats. It was then just a matter of finding the path of price increases that would 
keep public dissatisfaction within tolerable bounds. Price subsidies were no longer 
serving the development objectives of rapid industrialization because they were 
curtailing the oil-export basis of the industrialization strategy. In the 1990s, overall 
petroleum-product growth has been approximately 8 percent per year; not as low as 
the energy conservation planners would like, and not much lower than the rates of the 
1970s, but, coming at a time of rapid economic growth (GDP growth of 7 to 8 percent) 
and expansion of the transportation fleet, such growth in petroleum consumption is
25 Ibid., pp 87-90.
26 Ibid., p. 23.
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not a reckless outcome. Reductions in subsidies for kerosene reduced the growth in 
kerosene demand from 10 percent to 5 percent by the 1990s.27
Insights into Root Problems
The 1975 bankruptcy, and the poor investments that it revealed, provide 
important insights into the relationship between fiscal arrangements and financial 
profligacy. One root of Pertamina's 1975 debacle, and indeed the undiscipline of 
Pertamina spending since its inception, was the sheer fact that the company so easily 
held onto the oil resource rent. Pertamina, like so many other state oil companies, paid 
royalties that were not based on the full oil rents that should be captured at the outset 
by the resource owner (i.e., the government rather than the state enterprise). This 
under-pricing was itself a policy failure that induced over-exploitation, but it had the 
additional perverse effects of leaving Pertamina with huge windfall profits when 
world oil prices were high. Even if Pertamina had not been guilty of failing to turn 
over all of the revenues owed to the treasury, as the Commission of Four alleged, it 
would still have had enormous surplus to allocate, especially in boom years like 1974.
Yet this under-pricing is particularly problematic when combined with 
minimal transparency and high willingness of top government officials to allow or 
even demand extra-sectoral investments by the state enterprise. From the outset, 
Pertamina was conceived as a conglomerate and rewarded for behaving as such. Barnes 
puts it well when he says that Pertamina "ran itself as a kind of national development 
corporation for Indonesia."28 Pertamina's 1968 articles of incorporation, and the 1971 
law specifying its monopoly over oil-related operations, did not limit Pertamina to the 
oil sector, and indeed the idea that Pertamina was a far-flung conglomerate akin to the 
multinational corporations was a source of pride for many Indonesians.
However, this conception of a rent-capturing state enterprise as a diversified 
conglomerate violated a basic principle of public finance that the government's 
resources ought to be allocated centrally to increase the likelihood that the most 
worthwhile projects and programs will be chosen across the entire economy. 
Pertamina publications in general stressed that all of its ventures have been chosen 
with the expectation of profitability, but the company has never been in the position to 
be able to judge whether its investment possibilities have been as great as other 
possibilities available to the government. Moreover, the technical capability of oil 
company executives to select and manage non-oil-related ventures was clearly 
problematic. Thus the reforms that Pertamina has undergone have increased its 
managerial efficiency as well as its investment efficiency, simply by reducing die scope 
of the company and thus confining it to the sector in which it has a fighting chance to 
operate with solid professional judgment.
Forestry Policy
The forestry sector was largely untouched while Pertamina was the main agent 
of off-budget government spending. Dipterocarp forests blanketed Sumatra, East and
27 Ibid., p. 87.
28 Ibid., p. 151. We shall see that in later years the Forestry Ministry played a comparable role.
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West Kalimantan on Borneo, and Irian Jaya. Modest farming and plantations were 
emerging on Sumatra, and local peoples engaged in even more modest shifting 
cultivation on Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, yet forest clearing was essentially limited to 
the few logging concessions that the government began issuing in the late 1960s in the 
wake of the Foreign Investment Law of 1967 and the Domestic Investment Law of 
1968. In 1970, the sixty-four concession areas covered less than eight million hectares, a 
tiny fraction of the vast expanse of these islands.
Yet in the 1970s and 1980s, the concession areas increased vastly in number and 
size. Legal and illegal logging exploded. Of course, not all deforestation was due to 
logging—slash-and-burn agriculture, as well as conversion of natural forest to 
plantations and to sedentary agriculture, were also important. Yet even the slash-and- 
burn agriculture could be partially traced to logging, as logging roads opened the path 
for slash-and-burn cultivators to move further into the interior.
The serious impacts of over-logging on the forests have been documented 
elsewhere.29 Here it is necessary only to point out that beyond the impact on the forests 
and ecosystems, the forest-products industry, propped up by cheap but shrinking 
inputs, is both inefficient and vulnerable to supply shortages. The proceeds from 
forestry exploitation have been squandered in unwise investments both within and 
outside of the forestry and wood-products subsectors.
The government policies responsible for these problems are not hard to find: 
huge, unmonitorable concessions; harvesting regulations that permit high-grading and 
high damage to non-harvested trees; inadequate royalties that also encourage high- 
grading; a reforestation fee-and-refund system that rarely provides refunds or 
stimulates reforestation; a ban on log exports that has shrunk the market for 
Indonesian timber, costing hundreds of millions of dollars in lost exports and 
exacerbating the inefficiency of wood-products industry; land classifications that 
contribute to poor land uses; and an ineffective plantation-subsidy program.30
29 The World Bank, Indonesia: Sustainable Development cf Forests, Land, and Water (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1990) estimated that Indonesia was losing forest at a rate of one million hectares annually as of 1988. 
Since the more accessible, higher-yielding areas are targeted for logging before the less accessible ones 
(such as the relatively low quality, inaccessible forests of Irian Jaya), the loss of 1 percent of the total 
forested area is of much greater economic significance for future supplies of timber than it might appear at 
first glance. There are estimates that all commercial timber will be gone within thirty years if present rates 
of exploitation continue. See Adam Schwarz, "A Saw Point for Ecology," Far Eastern Economic Review,
April 19,1990, p. 62. Some prized furniture woods, such as ramin, are already becoming scarce. Depletion 
of the Sumatran forests has resulted in the need to import logs from Kalimantan to supply the Sumatran 
mills; interviews with executives in the forest-products industry reveal that some supplies are faltering 
even in Kalimantan. Some government officials estimate that throughout the country, sawmills are 
operating at only an average of 40 percent capacity (although this is a reflection of poor siting of the mills 
and the growth of plywood manufacturing, as well as overall problems of supply). Non-governmental 
sources estimate commercial logging rates at around forty-four million cubic meters of wood annually. See 
WALHI [Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia; Indonesian Forum for the Environment], Sustainability 
and Economic Rent in the Forestry Sector (Jakarta: WALHI, 1991). This far exceeds the government's own 
calculation of the maximum sustainable yield of thirty-one million cubic meters. See FAO [Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations] and Directorate General of Forest Utilization, Ministry of 
Forestry, Government of Indonesia, Situation and Outlook of the Forestry Sector in Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Government of Indonesia, 1990).
30 The particular policy failures were the following:
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1) The formal harvesting system that prevails throughout most of Indonesia's non-plantation 
production forests (the so-called Indonesian Selective Logging and Regeneration System) leaves the 
harvester essentially free to remove the best trees, has not prevented relogging within five to ten years 
rather than the thirty-five years formally required by the policy, and encourages very high collateral 
logging damage that can affect nearly 40 percent of standing stock. See Malcolm Gillis, "Indonesia: Public 
Policies, Resource Management, and the Tropical Forest," in Public Policies and the Misuse of Forest 
Resources, ed. Robert Repetto; and Malcolm Gillis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 100. 
For information on logging damage to standing stock, see World Bank, Indonesia: Sustainable Development,
p. 10.
2) The practice of granting huge concessions (some over 1 million ha.) has made it impossible for the 
government and concessionaires to police the larger concessions, while the concessionaires have no 
responsibility to permit local people access to concession areas when active logging is not occurring. 
Malcolm Gillis points out that government regulation of a few huge concessions may or may not be more 
difficult than regulation of many smaller concessions; however, huge concessions are difficult for the 
concessionaires themselves to police in terms of invasion by shifting cultivators or poachers. He also 
points out that "restriction of concession size will discourage speculation in the form of 'stockpiling' of 
desirable tracts to keep them out of the hands of other firms." See Malcolm Gillis, "Forest Concession 
Management and Revenue Policies," in Managing the World's Forests, ed. Narendra Sharma (Dubuque, 
Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing for the World Bank, 1992), p. 149. The concession policy also has vague 
renewal criteria that permit political considerations to enter and leave the concessionaires with little 
incentive to manage their concessions sustainably.
3) The royalty and taxation system, based largely on an ad valorem royalty, captures far too little of the 
natural resource rent (roughly 20 percent of declared rents) and also encourages high-grading, the practice 
of removing only the most valuable trees. It is a problematic practice because 1) greater areas suffer 
collateral damage to obtain the target volume of timber; 2) forest stands become degraded as the best 
specimens are removed. The low level of rent capture encourages over-harvesting, puts considerable 
resources in the hands of individuals and companies with no incentive to re-invest them in the Indonesian 
economy, and undermines the timber estate initiative.
4) The reforestation subsidy policy, financed by a large reforestation fee on the volume of timber 
removed, is ostensibly designed to encourage loggers to replant in order to receive refunds of their 
reforestation deposits, but the government has rarely provided the refunds for qualifying concessionaires. 
The fee is effectively a volume tax, nearly of the same magnitude as the normal ad valorem royalty. See 
Gillis, "Forest Concession Management," pp. 161-2. There it also induces high-grading, because the 
removal of more valuable trees does not incur a higher tax, thus effectively reducing the tax rate. The 
retention of the reforestation fees by the Forestry Department has provided it an enormous fund, 
equivalent to around US$1 billion, with no external controls or monitoring on its disposition of the funds. 
As of mid-1992, private sources and interviews estimated the Forestry Ministry's deforestation fund at 
US$800,000,000; some interviewees believed that it had exceeded US$1 billion. There has been much 
speculation that the funds have been used for political purposes; it is no surprise that the monitoring of 
the fund has been inadequate.
5) The promotion of down-stream wood-products, including a ban on round-log and rattan export 
and substantial subsidies to the processors, has led to inefficient processing that is vulnerable both to 
international competition and to the reduction in inputs from domestic logging. See Kartawinata Kuswata, 
Soedarsono Riswan, and Andrew Vayda, "The Impact of Man on a Tropical Forest in Indonesia," Ambio 
10,2-3 (1984): 115; and Gillis, "Indonesia: Public Policies," pp. 56-57. The export ban, enacted in 1980 with a 
five-year phase-in period, was an extension of the 1978 policy for promoting the domestic forest-products 
industry through higher export taxes on round logs than on sawn timber or plywood. In mid-1992 the 
outright ban was replaced by an export tax, not to increase log exports but simply to redirect the 
jurisdiction over the ban from the Ministry of Industry to the Finance Ministry. This is not a very 
significant change in terms of the possibility of exporting round logs, since the export tax is prohibitively 
high. Gillis estimates that in 1981 and 1982 alone, the Indonesian economy lost over US$400,000,000 of 
forgone revenues, equivalent to 27 percent of the timber rent, largely because of inefficiencies of 
processing. See Gillis, "Indonesia: Public Policies," pp. 95-97. Bruce Fitzgerald found that four dollars in 
log exports were sacrificed for every dollar gained in plywood exports. See Bruce Fitzgerald, An Analysis
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At first glance, it seems that the same basic pattern of cheap forest concessions 
and under-regulation existed to benefit the politically powerful during the entire 
period from the late 1960s to the present. This has prompted some observers (e.g., 
Robin Broad) to characterize the entire period as a uniform and static arrangement.31 In 
fact, there have been critical changes over time that reveal important changes in the 
logic and political motives of these policies.
The groundwork for these policies was laid before timber rents became 
important. In the late 1960s the Suharto government appropriated 90 percent of all 
forest land, thereby centralizing government control over forest resources, negating 
traditional property rights. This set the scene for a massive forest concession system 
and eliminated obstacles for foreign firms to operate forest concessions.
Royalties and taxes on timber harvesting were kept low, amounting in total to 
only a quarter of the stumpage value during the 1967-75 period, declining to less than 
10 percent by 1985-86.32 Domestic and foreign timber companies responded 
enthusiastically; from 1967 to 1973, timber exports more than doubled every year. By 
1973, Indonesia was the world's largest tropical timber exporter. Foreign investment in 
the forest sector boomed, with Japanese, Korean, Philippine, Malaysian, and US timber 
companies investing heavily in roads and equipment, although the demand for round 
log exports kept investment in local processing (e.g., sawmills) quite low. The
of Indonesian Trade Policies: Countertrade, Downstream Processing, Import Restrictions and the Deletion Program 
(Washington, DC: World Bank CPD Discussion Paper 1986-22, July 1986). It was not until 1988 that the 
value of plywood exports exceeded the 1979 log export earnings of US$2.1 billion. See Adam Schwarz, 
"Timber Troubles," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 6,1989, pp. 86-88.
6) Inconsistencies in land classification have both detracted from optimal land use and weakened 
conservation regulations. Different agencies use different classifications, resulting in suboptimal land use 
and confusing information. The Forestry Ministry has clung to its jurisdiction over some land of relatively 
high agricultural potential and already deforested. The World Bank study estimates that 30 percent of 
Sumatra's land within forestry boundaries is unforested); other areas, classified as conversion forests 
though of poor soils, are barred to the Forestry Ministry because they are classified as conversion forests. 
See World Bank, Indonesia: Sustainable Development, p. 31.
7) The timber estate promotion policy, impelled by growing concern over supply shortages for the 
wood-products industry, has subsidized questionable plantations. The World Bank estimates the subsidy 
at US$425 per hectare. See World Bank, Indonesia: Sustainable Development, p. 14. The money comes from 
the Forestry Ministry's reforestation fund, and the claimants are largely already-established, vertically 
integrated timber companies. The lack of subsidy beyond the third year encourages the planting of 
inexpensive species and minimal maintenance, leading to stands of little value at harvest time. 
Prohibitions against foreign ownership of concessions effectively deter the multinational companies with 
sufficient capital and technology for successful plantations. See Malcolm Gillis, "Multinational Enterprises 
and Environmental and Resource Management Issues in the Indonesian Tropical Forest Sector," in 
Multinational Corporations, Environment, and the Third World: Business Matters, ed. Charles Pearson 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 75. But the main problem is that low timber rent capture from 
concession areas makes the logging of natural forests more economically attractive than plantations to the 
forestry industry. There is an incentive to capture the benefits of the zero-interest loans by diverting the 
funds to other projects, and then walk away from the plantations because even successful production 
would be difficult to sell in light of the low price of logs from natural forests.
31 Robin Broad, "The Political Economy of Natural Resources: Case Studies of the Indonesian and 
Philippine Forest Sectors," The Journal of Developing Areas 29 (April 1995): 317-340.
32 These figures are from I. Ruzicka, "Rent Appropriation in Indonesian Logging: East Kalimantan 1972/3  
-1976 /7 ,"  Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (July, 1977): 45-74; World Bank, Indonesia: Sustainable 
Development; and Gillis, "Indonesia: Public Policies."
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multinationals were making decent profits based on rather large investments, but the 
major rent beneficiaries were top military leaders granted concessions and the 
Indonesian Chinese loggers brought in to provide the expertise and operational 
capability in partnerships with these officers. As in Malaysian Sarawak,33 the 
politically powerful rent recipients could largely sit back and have others exploit their 
forest concessions for a split of the proceeds. In Sarawak, this has been the powerful 
civilian bumiputra Sarawakians; in Indonesia it was the armed forces.
Yet, beginning in 1979, the government moved to tax and then ban all round- 
log exports by 1985.34 This ban seems to fly in the face of political logic, inasmuch as it 
dealt a blow to the economic fortunes of the presumably politically powerful military 
concessionaires. This policy also destroyed millions of dollars of timber value by 
forcing Indonesian timber into highly inefficient, value-reducing domestic production. 
The forestry sector as a whole suffered, as would be expected of any constraint 
imposed on the predominant activity—in this case raw log export—chosen by the 
concessionaires to maximize their returns. In 1980 the Indonesian government also 
began the exclusion of foreign firms as concessionaires, expanded to a full ban by 1984. 
Some joint ventures with Indonesian firms remained viable, but clearly the 
multinational companies, formerly encouraged, were largely removed from logging. 
This made it much more difficult for the forestry sector to take advantage of 
multinationals' technological and potential environmental expertise. Theories of the 
insidious power of the multinational corporation certainly fall flat in accounting for 
this turn-about.
Also in 1980 the government established a reforestation fund under the control 
of the Forestry Ministry. Initially represented as an environmental measure, this fund 
collected a fee on the volume of declared timber harvested. In theory, it was to be 
refunded to concessionaires who reforested, but because the refund would be far less 
than the costs of reforesting, virtually none of the fund was ever devoted to 
reforestation. Thus the reforestation charge amounted to a royalty; however, it was 
retained by the Forestry Ministry rather than sent to the central treasury as a charge on 
extracting the nation's timber wealth.
Tighter Regulation and the Growing Centrality of the Indonesian Chinese
Finally, around 1987 the government began to tighten up—selectively—on 
logging regulation, while launching several well-publicized "reforms" to increase the 
timber royalties. While it is true that some fines and threatened license cancellations 
were reversed, others were enforced, and a number of logging firms have lost their
33 Philip Hurst, Rainforest Politics: Ecological Destruction in South-east Asia (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: 
Zed Books, 1990), p. 105; Stanley Stesser, "A Reporter At Large in the Rainforest," The New Yorker, May 27, 
1991, pp. 62-63.
34 According to Gillis, this ban curtailed both logging very rapidly in 1981 and 1982, because sawmill 
capacity could not increase rapidly enough to handle the non-exportable logs. See Gillis, Indonesia and 
Public Policies, p. 55,
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concessions.35 This was certainly an odd way to treat the concessionaires if they indeed 
had, as Robin Broad puts it, "captured" forest policy away from the government.36
The political logic of this pattern is not obvious. To be sure, favoring the 
military has a straightforward explanation. As a relatively minor military figure who 
emerged from the chaos of the end of the Sukarno regime, General Suharto needed— 
but could not take for granted—the strong backing from the armed forces leadership. 
In a brilliant financial maneuver, Suharto set up "foundations" (yayasans) that would 
provide for very generous financial benefits for the armed forces and for retired 
military, particularly those of highest rank—as long as Suharto remained in office as 
president.37 But why not also favor the mainstream civilian pribumi political elite, as 
was done in Sarawak, allowing them to share with the military in exploiting the under- 
priced concessions? Suharto did not choose this alternative. Instead, he looked 
favorably upon joint ventures between military officers, both active and retired, and 
the Indonesian-Chinese business community, despite the lack of independent political 
power of the Indonesian Chinese. We may speculate that Suharto may have perceived 
the pribumi business sector as believing that it was entitled to preferential treatment, 
rather than believing that such treatment would have been an indulgence provided the 
President. The pribumi elite may have been both a threat to Suharto, if it could have 
pursued an alliance with other contenders for political leadership, and non-essential to 
Suharto if he could count on military support and undercut the economic power of the 
pribumi business elite. In cutting them out of most of the rent-seeking opportunities in 
the oil and forestry sectors, Suharto neutralized much of the power of this group that 
had had the potential for independent political power. Instead, he brought in the 
Indonesian Chinese, a much more dependent group.
Why the ethnic Chinese? This is the most intriguing and most important 
question in understanding the political economy of Indonesian forestry policy. It is not 
enough to say that a collaboration between the ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian 
armed forces, including General Suharto, dates back to the 1950s.38 This historical fact 
does not explain why the relationship was established or retained, nor whether the 
current rationales for maintaining it are even connected with the original motivations. 
There is, indeed, one consideration that makes the ethnic Chinese seem like a poor 
choice as the recipients of vast timber rents: they are so politically beholden to the 
government, and in particular to General Suharto, that directing lucrative rent-seeking 
opportunities to them seems like a waste of a resource. Certainly if their political 
support were the only factor, then billions of dollars worth of timber rents, on top of 
the fortunes they have been amassing through other business ventures, would have 
been unnecessary. Clearly the simplest rent-seeking model—the exchange of economic 
rents for the political support of the recipients—is inadequate to explain Suharto's 
choice of the ethnic Chinese.
35 Michael Ross, "The Political Economy of Boom-and-Bust Logging in Indonesia, the Philippines and East 
Malaysia, 1950-1994," PhD Dissertation, Princeton University Department of Politics, 1996, Chapter 5.
36 Broad, "The Political Economy of Natural Resources," p. 331.
37 These developments are analyzed with great insight in Ross, "The Political Economy," Chapter 5.
38 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 28, notes that two of today's biggest ethnic Chinese logging 
entrepreneurs, Liem Sioe Liong and "Bob Hasan," were allied with Suharto as early as the mid-1950s.
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However, if we look at the economic behavior of the ethnic-Chinese logging 
entrepreneurs, we see rather clear evidence that they reciprocate for their receipt of 
benefits, at the expense o f their private profit-maximization, in the choice of some of the 
business ventures they undertake. For example:
• The current industrial plantation strategy has put pressure on loggers to develop 
plantations even though some are unprofitable39;
• Some vertically integrated wood-products companies have undertaken clearly 
money-losing activities, including particle-board manufacture that has positive 
environmental symbolism but negative rates of return.40
• Logging firms have a formal obligation to provide community development 
assistance to the populations near or within the concession areas. While this 
obligation is vague, ad hoc, and poorly monitored, the Forestry Ministry does have 
considerable influence over whether and how the obligation will be met. Therefore 
the very fact that the obligation is discretionary gives the Forestry Ministry the 
opportunity to direct the "community development" in ways that conform with 
particular development strategies; for example, electrification or road building. 
Again, by placing the financing of such development projects on the shoulders of 
the private sector, the Forestry Ministry can pursue these projects without having 
to subject them to the evaluation and approval processes of the central budget 
authorities.
• In 1990-91 Mr. Prajogo Pangestu and the head of another major Chinese group, 
Mr. Liem Sioe Liong, reportedly covered US$420 million in foreign-exchange 
losses of the Bank Duta, which is largely owned by foundations connected with 
President Suharto.41 The same source reports that Prajogo is believed to have paid 
for the Taman Mini theme park monorail at the behest of the President's wife, 
financed a biography of Suharto, and accepted the President's children 
Trihatmodjo and Rukmana into joint partnerships.
Other projects, whose ultimate profitability may or may not be maximizing, 
have been undertaken by ethnic-Chinese Indonesians with the help of President 
Suharto against the policy preferences of the technocrats. For example, establishing a 
world-scale, wholly Indonesian-owned petrochemical industry has been a major 
attraction for the nationalists. One enormous Indonesian-owned petrochemical 
venture, the US$1.8 billion Chandra Asri olefins complex, had already begun 
construction by 1991, when an inter-ministerial coordinating group addressing 
Indonesia's increased foreign debt called for a slow-down on large development 
projects entailing significant foreign borrowing until 1995, and even set up a loan­
coordinating group (labeled "Team 39") that had to approve the foreign borrowing of
39 Jonathan Haughton, Darius Teter, and Joseph Stem, Report on Forestry Taxation, Memorandum to Minister 
Saleh Afiff (Jakarta, September 8,1992), p. 7.
40 Personal interviews, Pontianak, West Kalimantan, July 1992.
41 Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Friedland, "Green Fingers: Indonesia's Prajogo Proves that Money Grows 
on Trees," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 12,1992, p. 42.
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all state-related investments in infrastructure and petrochemicals.42 Chandra Asri was 
deemed to fall under the Team 39 restrictions because it was "state related" in the dual 
sense that it was designed to use naphtha inputs from the state oil company Pertamina, 
and had borrowed heavily from the state-owned Bank Bumi Daya.43 However, 
although pribumi businessmen initially seemed to be slated to control the private-sector 
component of this venture, President Suharto intervened to make Prajogo Pangestu 
and Liem Soie Liong the major private partners. By orchestrating pressure from 
multinational oil companies, international banks, and even the Japanese Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, their two conglomerates succeeded in gaining an 
exemption from the investment freeze. In short, the Indonesian Chinese have put their 
own funds into this questionable project and have provided the private-sector 
economic and political link, allowing President Suharto to avoid both becoming 
beholden to pribumi business elites or abandoning the project because of the objections 
from within the government.
Thus the Indonesian Chinese were included not only for their business 
expertise, international connections, and pre-existing business links with the armed 
forces, but also for their lack of status as an independent political force. Of course, the 
resentment of the Chinese on the part of the pribumi rose as a consequence, increasing 
the marginality of the Chinese should they ever lose the protection of Suharto, and 
thus increasing their dependence on Suharto.
The log-export prohibition raises the second puzzle, inasmuch as there seems to 
be an inconsistency in the political logic of imposing the export ban on the same actors 
who were increasingly privileged by underpriced timber royalties. One explanation is 
that the military no longer rated the patronage they had been receiving before. By 1980, 
the armed forces had been reorganized and became much less of a threat to Suharto's 
control.44 The simple business of contracting for the extraction and sale of logs was no 
longer the reward for military support; patronage now would go to those who could 
master the much more complex business of making a profit from manufacturing and 
marketing. The survivors were the firms that were adept enough to combine their 
access to logging concessions with their own sawmill and plywood facilities, and 
export connections. Many of the military officers had to sell out, moving the control of 
the forestry industry more firmly into the hands of the Indonesian Chinese. Second, the 
establishment of a wood-products industry fit into a broader strategy of industrializing 
the Indonesian economy even if the efficiency and profitability of these developments 
were questionable. The "nationalist" position in the Indonesian economic debate had 
(and still has) considerable ideological appeal, and, when pursued, has meant 
considerable economic benefits for some interests. There is no inconsistency in 
regarding the development of a wood products industry as both a concession to 
nationalist economic sentiment and a strategic end in itself. Another explanation is that 
the officials in the ministries of finance and industry at this point prevailed in the 
bureaucratic struggle over the forestry sector, with the backing of multilateral and 
bilateral donor agencies. Whatever combination of explanations holds, it is notable that
42 Schwarz and Friedland, "Green Fingers," p. 46.
43 Ibid.
44 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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President Suharto could afford to pursue this development strategy even though it 
meant withdrawing some of the benefits to presumably politically powerful groups.
Now, one might ask whether this post-1987 policy regime truly represents a 
new strategy. After all, royalty rates have remained quite low, and regulation is 
sporadic.45 It is still eminently possible for private loggers to make huge fortunes off of 
the nation's wealth through the under-pricing of state timber and selective 
enforcement. However, two differences are crucial. First, the concessionaires ran a risk 
of losing their concessions to a degree that was unheard of in the earlier period. 
Violations of forestry regulations could result in heavy fines, the withdrawal of 
concession rights, and other negative sanctions. In short, timber concessionaires have 
become vulnerable to regulation that is applied selectively by the government, 
particularly by the Forestry Ministry in alliance with the Presidency.
Second, the continual (if somewhat superficial) efforts at forestry policy reform 
not only represent a certain degree of responsiveness to pressure from environmental 
groups and international agencies such as the World Bank, but also put the 
concessionaires on notice that their collective performance must satisfy government 
objectives sufficiently to keep the reformers from wiping out the rent opportunities 
altogether. Thus, both individual and collective vulnerability have been introduced; 
the consequence is that concessionaires have to work for their privileges. A 
presumably unintended consequence of the pressure for reform coming from the 
Finance Ministry, BAPPENAS, USAID, and the World Bank has been the greater 
dependence of the loggers on the President's protection. Discretionary enforcement 
and partial reform pose risks to the already politically vulnerable Indonesian Chinese, 
risks which the military beneficiaries of forest rents did not have to face in the earlier 
period.
Thus the change in strategy that ousted the multinationals and marginalized 
the military in the forestry sector was not characterized so much by the elimination of 
rent-seeking opportunities; it instead involved shifting the beneficiaries and the terms. 
Initially, forest rents were offered by the government in exchange for political support 
from the clearly powerful military; the newer strategy initiated an exchange of forest 
rents for cooperation by the Indonesian Chinese in financing development projects and 
other off-budget initiatives. The Indonesian Chinese began as subsidiary actors in a 
political arrangement, involved for their business expertise; they became the linchpin 
of a much more complicated economic arrangement.
The "reforestation fund" demonstrates a parallel strategy of off-budget 
development financing, but through the state sector rather than the private sector. The 
fund, financed by a charge on logging ostensibly to be refunded to loggers willing to 
reforest their concession areas, was set at a level that effectively discouraged any such 
reforestation. The fund has been estimated at around US$800 million, with no external 
controls or monitoring on its disposition of the funds.46 There has been much 
speculation that the funds have been used for financing the campaigns of Suharto's
45 In 1991WALHI, Sustainability and Economic Rent, made a calculation, based on the government's own 
figures, that prevailing royalty rates were a fifth of actual stumpage values. Even after the rise of royalties 
from 1987 to the present, and by the most generous estimates, the government is capturing no more than 
40 percent of the timber rents on declared felling.
46 As of mid-1992, private sources and interviews estimated the Forestry Ministry's reforestation fund at 
US$800,000,000; some interviewees believed that it had exceeded US$1 billion.
From Oil to Timber 57
political party, Golkar. But more important for our arguments, the retention of the 
reforestation fee by the Forestry Ministry has served an internal bureaucratic-alliance 
purpose of providing the Forestry Ministry with an incentive to cooperate with the 
Presidency in development activities that seem very strange for a forestry ministry, 
since the current concession practices and agricultural conversion policies are 
essentially liquidating the Indonesian forests. Yet, in addition to maintaining 
jurisdiction over forest-designated areas even if they are not forested, the Forestry 
Ministry oversees (to be sure, in partnership with the Presidency) an enormous portion 
of Indonesia's territory: the three-fourths that is formally designated as forest, whether 
or not trees stand on this land. Therefore the Forestry Ministry has had major (though 
not uncontested) jurisdiction over much of the on-site operations of the transmigrasi 
resettlements on the Outer Islands. As Pertamina was the "quick and dirty" 
development agency of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Forestry Ministry took on 
this role in the late 1970s through the present.47 In the late 1980s the reforestation funds 
were directed to the concern over diminishing timber supplies. The Forestry Ministry 
offered zero-percent interest loans, plus government equity participation, for the 
establishment of plantations ("timber estates" in Indonesian parlance).48 The World 
Bank estimates the subsidy at US$425 per hectare.49 The claimants have largely been 
already established, vertically integrated timber companies.
The policy was criticized by the technocrats for the shortness of the subsidy 
period, which is limited to three years, and for the high likelihood that the same 
concessionaires who benefit from the government's low timber-rent capture would be 
subsidized yet again in their plantation initiatives.50 The lack of subsidy beyond the 
third year encourages the planting of inexpensive species and minimal maintenance, 
leading to stands of little value at harvest time. As prohibitions against foreign 
ownership of concessions effectively deter the largest multinational timber companies, 
the provision of sufficient capital and technology for successful plantations is very 
much in question.51 The low timber rent capture from the concession areas still makes 
the logging of natural forests more economically attractive to the forestry industry. 
Independent estimates show the plantations as having negative net present values.52 
Because these projects are largely privately unprofitable, there is an incentive to 
capture the benefits of the zero-interest loans by diverting the funds to other projects, 
and then walk away from the plantations because even successful production would 
be difficult to sell in light of the low prices of logs from natural forests. Finally, the 
initiative ignores the fact that most plantations in lowland humid tropics around the
47 William Ascher, Political Economy and Problematic Forestry Policies in Indonesia (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Center for Tropical Conservation, September 1993), pp. 11-12.
48 Government equity participation is considered an advantage, because the operation is more likely to 
receive fair or even favored treatment, rather than a disadvantage because of the risk of government 
interference.
49 World Bank, Indonesia: Sustainable Development, p. 14.
50 Interviews. See also Erik Scarborough, Some Initial Thoughts on Long Term Forestry Development 
Objectives and Policies in the Context of the Second Long-Term Development Plan (Jakarta: Natural Resources 
Management Project, March 6,1992), p. 14 and WALHI, Sustainability and Economic Rent, pp. 4,8 .
51 Gillis, "Indonesia: Public Policies," p. 75.
52 Haughton, Teter and Stem, Forestry Fees, p. 10.
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world have failed. The real issue is at the heart of the technocrat vs. nationalist debate: 
whether to subsidize the down-stream wood-products industry.
Finally, in late 1994 it was revealed that President Suharto had directed the 
Forestry Ministry to make a US$174 million interest-free loan to the state aircraft 
industry IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nurtanio; Indonesian State Aircraft 
Industry) for the development of the new N-250.53 The aerospace industry had been 
regarded by the technocrats within the government as a wasteful, money-losing 
prospect that could not be justified on economic grounds. The nationalists, on the other 
hand, saw it as an important symbol of Indonesia's international industrial prestige 
and potential in high technology. It is interesting, however, that the intra- 
governmental clash over whether the Forestry Ministry's loan was appropriate is not 
what brought the issue to light; it was the angered reaction of Indonesian 
environmental groups. For these groups, the use of the reforestation fund for aircraft 
development certainly symbolized the end of any hope or pretense that the 
reforestation fund would be used for reforestation, even though the more skeptical 
environmentalists and analysts had much earlier doubts. The environmental groups 
filed suit against the government for this diversion, which the courts ultimately 
refused to hear on the grounds that it was beyond their jurisdiction.
The environmental call to arms over the diversion of the reforestation funds to 
the state aircraft industry is a fascinating reframing of a clash over development 
strategy—another subsidized nationalist initiative with a questionable economic rate of 
return—into an apparent conflict between development and environment. In fact, 
there was never any environmental impact of the reforestation fee, because it had 
never been seriously applied to reforestation. The real issue was how the rent captured 
by the Forestry Ministry, rather than the treasury, would be directed. It was clearly 
directed to investments that the conventional budget authorities did not support. If the 
rent had been captured from the loggers and moved directly to the treasury, it would 
have been more under the control of the technocrats and certainly more transparent in 
revealing which projects were economically unviable without subsidization. In short, 
in the reforestation fund, President Suharto had found another off-budget vehicle for 
pursuing projects that would be difficult or at least awkward to undertake through the 
conventional budget process.
D. Conclusions
The Indonesian forestry case is a clear demonstration of suboptimal forest 
policies and practices that can be linked to the off-budget pursuit of development 
strategies ranging from downstream wood-products to aerospace. To be sure, this 
motive is commingled with other motives such as political campaign finance and 
personal aggrandizement. Yet the fact that President Suharto has allowed and directed 
forestry rents to flow into investments in support of the so-called nationalist economic 
development strategy, specifically when liberalizing, free-market officials tended to
53 Anonymous, "IPTN's Loans Converted to Equity," Jakarta Post, January 31,1997.
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dominate "on-budget" fiscal and monetary policy, is the clearest demonstration of this 
dynamic that has emerged from the examination of a large number of cases.54
My argument runs counter to the conventional view that President Suharto has 
simply been preoccupied with enriching himself and his family to the maximum 
degree possible; but it also rejects the view that the natural resource exploiters have 
"captured" a "weak state." The first view presumes that the machinations with
54 However, it is by no means the only case of suboptimality in resource policy that can be linked to the 
pursuit of such programmatic objectives. The following types of resource policy failures and 
corresponding cases could be demonstrated with a rather high degree of plausibility:
a. Down-stream industrialization has been a favored strategy for wood products; several countries such 
as Liberia have joined with Indonesia in forcing the under-pricing of timber inputs through round-log 
export bans. State-led wood-products industrialization has also been subsidized by allowing the state 
forestry enterprise to retain royalties that should have been paid to the government, as in the case of the 
Honduran state enterprise COHDEFOR (Corporacion Hondurena de Foresteria; Honduran Forestry 
Development Corporation), which launched a disastrous wood-processing subsidiary, Corfino, in the 
1980s.
In the oil sector, down-stream processing has been subsidized by allowing state enterprises, such as 
Venezuela's PDVSA and Nigeria's NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation), to retain oil 
royalties rather than surrender them to the government as a private oil company would.
b. Up-stream industrialization was financed in Mexico by excluding foreign oil companies from 
engaging in exploration and allowing the state oil company PEMEX to retain large surpluses prior to 1978.
c. Energy-intensive industrialization has been promoted in many oil-rich countries by keeping domestic 
oil-products prices low. This has occurred in Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela, and other oil-exporting 
countries with significant non-oil economies.
Heavy over-development of hydro-electric power by the state, and under-pricing of the electricity 
produced, is a similar strategy of industrial promotion in many countries. Colombia in particular has had 
extremely high hydro-electric costs that, in not being transferred to electricity users, have stimulated 
energy-intensive industries but also excessive electricity use and expenses.
d. Agricultural development has been stimulated by over-extension and over-subsidization of irrigation 
in Mexico, India, and many other countries. Land give-aways without appropriate charges for the land's 
intrinsic resource rent are also employed as agricultural promotion policies. This has occurred in Egypt's 
notorious policy of giving agricultural land to college graduates even if they lack agricultural experience 
and training.
e. Regional development strategies have been launched through the under-pricing of state-controlled 
resource bases in many countries. For example, Brazil's Amazonian land give-aways and cattle-ranching 
subsidies in the 1980s were part of a regional development strategy of Amazonian settlement, just as Costa 
Rica's decentralization policies gave land away outside of the central valley of San Jose.
Unwise resource development has also occurred in the oil sector, such as Peru's unsuccessful state oil 
exploration in the Amazon, often in areas of low prospectivity. This was, in part, also an Amazonian 
development strategy as well, partly in reaction to the Brazilian efforts.
In the mineral sector, the development of several "backward" districts in India has been promoted by 
continuing money-losing copper mines; this is as much a regional strategy as it is an income-distribution 
strategy.
In every case the government could have pursued the development strategy without extracting 
surpluses from the natural-resource exploitation process. Direct investments or inexpensive credit could 
have been made available from the central treasuries. This is not to argue that direct investments or 
subsidized credit would be good economic policy; these initiatives are all suspect in the eyes of market- 
oriented economists. Indeed, certain government officials resort to transfers via the natural-resource 
exploitation process in order to circumvent the influence of such economists and to avoid the publicity of 
revelations that these strategies are unsound from a broad societal perspective.
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forestry concessions are simply means to enrich Suharto relatives who are so often in 
partnership with the Indonesian Chinese logging conglomerates. To some observers 
who (quite correctly) note that the logging has typically been unsustainable and 
environmentally damaging, the government's actions (granting logging concessions to 
these entrepreneurs, non-enforcement of forestry regulations, and the involvement of 
Suharto's relatives in the conglomerates) seem like overt nose-thumbing by a president 
who does not care about impressions. This interpretation presumes that the spectacle 
of abuse apparent to the expert observer who has access to the Far Eastern Economic 
Review is as apparent to the Indonesian public. In truth, the machinations in the 
forestry sector were, for many years, only murkily perceived by the public and even by 
rather knowledgeable Indonesians. The pursuit of development objectives through the 
manipulation of natural resource exploitation is less transparent than the obvious 
alternative of pursuing them through direct government expenditures through the 
central budget.
The mechanism of "laundering" timber rents through the private loggers is 
rather distinctive because in most other countries this laundering is conducted through 
state actors. This distinction has led some observers to diagnose the Indonesian 
situation as "state capture" by presumably powerful private groups, such as the 
Indonesian Chinese. The state-capture view is put perhaps most extremely by Robin 
Broad, who argues that in both Indonesia and the Philippines:
[the forestry] sector molds the state and influences the policy-making environment 
. . .  [T]he political influence of those who gain economically from the exploitation 
of rainforest resources . . .  is used to thwart proposals both for broader-based 
development and for environmental reform.55
[T]he abundance of natural resources has catalyzed interactions further entwining 
the state with privileged groups. That state finds itself without relative autonomy 
to pursue policies that do not reflect the short-term interests of the exploiters; parts 
of the state are not just politicized but are "captured." Such a state is not what has 
been called a "strong state' or a "developmental state"—that is, one able to 
formulate and implement policies independently of powerful groups.56
Broad's analysis ignores three absolutely crucial facts. First, the Indonesian 
Chinese logging entrepreneurs have very little independent political power; indeed, 
they have been selected as successful rent-seekers precisely because o f their limited independent 
political power. Second, their use of profits from logging has been far from profit- 
maximizing. The crucial fact is that hundreds of millions of dollars worth of timber 
rents were destroyed by the imposition of the log-export ban, and the domestic logging 
concessionaires could otherwise have captured much of this value. The need for 
vertical integration was forced upon the domestic logging companies, often at 
considerable loss to these companies. The Indonesian Chinese engaged in other 
money-losing activities, in the classical mode of "rent dissipation" foreseen in the 
models of actors who, rather than controlling the state, have to compete for its favors.57
55 Broad, "The Political Economy of Natural Resources," pp. 321-2.
56 Ibid., p. 331.
57 See Robert Tollison, "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos 35 (1982): 575-602.
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Third, the Indonesian presidency (if not the entire government or state) has been quite 
capable of pursuing a long-term development policy—it just happens to be a mixed 
nationalist and neoclassical strategy that is obviously not to Broad's liking, but it is a 
strategy nonetheless, and the Indonesian Chinese have been instrumental in furthering 
this strategy.
From this perspective, the state is not so much weak as it is divided; the 
nationalist-technocrat divide makes the game of resource-rent diversion necessary if 
these divisions are to be kept relatively quiet. To assert that the Indonesian state is 
weak because it has to keep these divisions from becoming overt would also be 
misguided, inasmuch as the Suharto government has been able to keep them quiet and 
pursue a mix of nationalist and technocrat-approved projects, at minimal political cost.
Several intriguing interpretive questions do remain. Why is it that President 
Suharto, certainly very powerful if not omnipotent, has gone to such lengths and has 
sacrificed the soundness of the natural resource exploitation? Could not the serious 
inefficiencies in the nation's second-largest foreign-exchange-earning industry be 
avoided if Suharto had pursued these development projects through other means, 
including straightforward budget allocations over the objections of the Finance 
Ministry, BAPPENAS, and other agencies?
One reason, surely, is that there has been an enormous premium on the 
appearance of consensus, as part of the Pancasila ideology. But why is the reduction or 
avoidance of apparent disunity within the government preferable to the scandals that 
the circumvention of the conventional fiscal authorities occasionally precipitate? Is it 
simply the case that in Indonesian political culture, the credibility of governance 
depends more on running the government smoothly than on running it without 
scandal?
Whatever the answers to these questions, appreciating the richness of the 
motivations and circumstances that have led to unsound natural resource policies and 
practices allows us to raise the explore the following pragmatic issues:
1) Under what circumstances would government oversight of the exploitation 
of a particular natural resource prevent some government agencies from sacrificing the 
soundness of resource exploitation in order to circumvent the influence of other 
agencies? For example, would the inter-ministerial oversight that seems to work well 
for the oil sector also work for the forestry sector? Would eco-system management 
reduce the incentive for agencies like the Forestry Ministry to adopt unsound policies 
that under current arrangements cost such agencies little in terms of their institutional 
interests? What would happen if the Forestry Ministry could maintain jurisdiction only 
over areas that are actually forested?
2) At what level of visibility and notoriety of resource abuses would the top 
government leaders find that the political costs exceed the benefits of hiding intra- 
govemmental disunity? Some of the reactions to the criticisms of local groups and the 
international community in both the oil and forestry sectors do indicate that avoiding 
such notoriety is a relevant motive for some modicum of reform. In other words, how 
important is transparency; and how can it be combined with other actions (such as 
conditionalities) to reform natural resource practices?

